begin hiring managers and sales within a year of founding
Hiring Is Usually the Last Problem to Show Up
The call usually goes something like this.
“We have a product. We have a marketing team. We can’t sell. We need someone who knows the industry.”
I’ve had a version of that conversation more times than I can count, and I want to start by saying up front that the instinct behind it is sound. A founder with a working product, a marketing function, and minimal revenue is under real pressure. Reaching for someone who has done this before, who knows the buyers, who can pick up the phone and get a meeting on reputation alone, is what any sensible person would do. It’s the fastest-looking route from where they are to where they need to be. And it’s how most hiring problems get diagnosed: as hiring problems.
The problem is not the instinct. The question you should be asking is what the instinct is standing in for.
What the search is actually asking for
When I trace that request back, the company almost never has a validated picture of who actually buys. There’s a product. There are some early customers, often quite different from each other. There’s a marketing team that has an ideal customer profile, in the sense that it has described the buyer sixteen different ways, run campaigns at very different personas, and is still experimenting to find out where engagement actually comes from. And there is an open role for a salesperson whose real job, whether anyone says so or not, is to decide who the company can sell to.
The real tell is when a hiring manager asks for “someone with a Rolodex.” Often, that’s a company facing challenges with market penetration or sales growth. The job description becomes a request for a person who will verify the ideal customer profile on the company’s behalf, using contacts built somewhere else, and close deals against a positioning that may or may not be proven.
Look at it that way and the search was never going to find “the right person.” The company is asking the right person to validate a strategy.
Why the Rolodex doesn’t travel
There’s a reason this fails even when the hire is excellent. Research on what happens when strong performers move firms has a consistent finding: what they bring with them only translates once the new company gives it something to attach to. Raffiee and Byun, writing in the Academy of Management Journal, call it the portability paradox. External hires often take longer to lift performance than expected, not because they’re the wrong people, but because they first have to rebuild the knowledge and relationships that made them effective where they came from.[1] Every company hires from outside. Startups have nowhere else to hire from. The point isn’t to avoid the external hire. It’s that a Rolodex is only an asset in a company that already knows what it’s asking that Rolodex to do. Otherwise the hire spends their first year reconstructing what the founder assumed they’d bring in the door.
So the salesperson with the Rolodex lands, discovers nobody has proven the buyer, spends six months working it out through trial and error with a comp plan that punishes the learning, and either leaves or gets asked to. The founder concludes they hired the wrong person. Then they open the search again, with the same job description.
Why the hiring problem shows up last
Here is the part I think most founders haven’t looked at.
The hiring problem didn’t start when the search opened. It started in a meeting months earlier, one that had nothing to do with hiring, when the company committed to a plan without pressure-testing whether it knew enough to execute it.
Two Wharton researchers, Saerom Lee and J. Daniel Kim, published a study in 2024 that makes this concrete. They wanted to know when startups begin to scale, and since companies don’t announce it, they needed a proxy. They chose the moment a company first posts a job for a manager or a salesperson. That, in their model, is the observable point at which a business commits to its idea and starts spending against it. Across 6.3 million job postings from more than 38,000 US startups, companies that reached that point within six to twelve months of founding were 20 to 40 percent more likely to fail, and no more likely to reach a successful exit.[2]
The researchers didn’t treat the first sales hire as a symptom. They treated it as the decision.
What it means: the moment a company posts its first sales role is the moment it starts executing on what it thinks it knows. Everything that follows is downstream of how much it actually knew.
The pain arrives on a delay
Which means the pain arrives on a delay. A company commits in month four. The role opens in month six. The hire lands in month nine. By month fifteen, revenue hasn’t moved, the salesperson is on their way out, and the founder is describing a hiring problem. The decision that caused it is nearly a year old and nobody in the room remembers it as a decision. It felt like progress at the time.
That delay is why hiring is usually the last problem to show up, and why it’s so consistently misdiagnosed as a recruiting problem. Recruiting is where the symptom lands. It’s rarely where the cause lives.
The same move in every room
Sales is where I see it most, but the pattern isn’t about sales. It’s about hiring a person to stand in for a decision the company hasn’t made yet. Once you see the shape of it, it turns up everywhere.
-
The senior engineer standing in for a roadmap
An early-stage company hires its first senior engineer and, without quite saying so, expects that person to own everything: what to build, in what order, for whom, and how it will reach the market. There’s no product function yet to supply evidence about what customers want. So the company asks the engineer to know it. They’ve built things before, the reasoning goes, so they’ll know what the market needs. What the company has actually hired is someone to make three decisions on its behalf, product, roadmap, and go-to-market, and to make them without data. “We need someone very senior” is often a founder’s honest read of how many decisions are still open, not of how hard the engineering is.
-
The comp band standing in for a market position
A company sets a salary for a role by looking at what it can afford, then wonders why the search keeps surfacing people who aren’t quite right. The band was never a decision about where the company wants to sit in the market for that skill. It was a budget line. If You Don’t Know Where You Pay, You Don’t Have a Talent Strategy covers this in full, but the short version is that a pay position is a strategy statement whether or not anyone authored it, and a search run against an unauthored one finds exactly who you’d expect.
-
The req flood standing in for a headcount plan
After a raise, leadership approves the headcount plan and every function opens its roles at once. Nobody stops to ask whether the plan that produced those roles was ever tested against the market, the roadmap, or each other. This is the moment Lee and Kim’s data is describing. It looks like momentum. It’s a stack of commitments made in a single afternoon.
Mark Leslie and Charles Holloway wrote about the sales version of this at Stanford twenty years ago, arguing that companies which add sales capacity before they’ve learned how customers actually buy end up with disappointing revenue and a cash shortfall. Holloway’s summary still holds: “It’s too late to get involved in sales strategy when you notice a gap between what you think your salespeople should be selling and what they actually are selling.”[3] By the time the gap is visible, the decision that opened it is months old.
What changes when talent is in the room
I’m not going to tell you the answer is to hire a talent leader. Plenty of companies with one still make these mistakes. What I will say is that the question a good talent leader asks before opening a search is the question that surfaces the missing decision.
Ask it about the salesperson with the Rolodex and the answer is “we need to know whether the buyer we’ve chosen is the buyer that buys.” Put it to the senior engineer and the answer is “we need evidence about what to build, and someone to own that evidence.” Apply it to the twelve roles that opened after the raise and the answer, uncomfortably, is that nobody has checked whether they add up to a company.
None of those are hiring answers. All of them are decisions that belong to the founder and the leadership team, and they’re far cheaper to make before the search opens than after three well-credentialed people have come and gone.
Experience isn’t shortening the ramp
Skipping the question costs time, and the time is getting longer. The Bridge Group’s 2026 research on the account executive role, which surveys 158 B2B companies (note that The Bridge Group is a sales consultancy, so read its benchmarks in that light), puts average ramp to full productivity at 6.2 months, the highest in the study’s twenty-year history. Companies are responding by demanding more experience at hire, up to 3.7 years from 2.7 in 2022. Ramp keeps rising anyway.[4] Buying experience is not shortening the runway. If anything, it’s the Rolodex logic tested against data: the more a company relies on what a hire brings from elsewhere, the more time that hire spends discovering it doesn’t transfer.
Every month of that ramp spent working out who the customer is, or what the roadmap should be, is a month the company is paying a senior salary for a strategy session it could have run itself, earlier, for free.
The decision was made in a different meeting
So when the call comes, “we can’t find the right person,” I’ve learned to hear it differently.
It usually isn’t a hiring problem. It’s a planning problem that has been travelling through the company for the better part of a year, picking up a job description along the way, and hiring is simply where it surfaced. The role was defined by what was missing, not by what the work required. The candidate was asked to bring a decision, not a skill.
If your searches keep failing at the same stage, for the same kind of role, it’s worth asking a different question than “why can’t we find them.” Try: what did we decide, or fail to decide, that made this role look like the answer?
You’ll usually find the meeting. It probably wasn’t about hiring.
If the role itself is the problem, Why Most Hiring Processes Fail goes one layer down into how roles get defined. And if you’re wondering who should be asking these questions before the search opens, that’s the case I make in Who Holds Your Hiring Bar When You’re Not in the Room?
The candidate was asked to bring a decision.
Sources & References
-
1Raffiee, J., & Byun, H. (2020). Revisiting the Portability of Performance Paradox: Employee Mobility and the Utilization of Human and Social Capital Resources. Academy of Management Journal, 63(1), 34–63. journals.aom.org
-
2Lee, S. (R.), & Kim, J. D. (2024). When Do Startups Scale? Large-Scale Evidence from Job Postings. Strategic Management Journal, 45(9), 1633–1669. Dataset of 6.3 million job postings across more than 38,000 US startups founded after 2010. doi.org/10.1002/smj.3596
-
3Leslie, M., & Holloway, C. A. (2006). The Sales Learning Curve. Harvard Business Review, July–August 2006. Holloway quotation from Stanford Graduate School of Business, “Startups Need a Special Learning Curve for Sales.” Cited as the foundational framework on this question; no later work has replaced it. gsb.stanford.edu
-
4Bertuzzi, M. (2026). AE Models, Motions & Metrics: 2026 Research Report (10th ed.). The Bridge Group. Survey of 158 B2B companies. The Bridge Group is a sales consultancy; benchmarks are vendor research. bridgegroupinc.com
Are your open roles standing in for decisions?
We work with growth-stage founders to get the planning questions answered before the search opens, so the person you hire is asked to bring a skill, not a strategy.
Get in Touch